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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge: 
 
This case arises from the denial of Tommaso Fargnoli's 
("Fargnoli") application for disability insurance benefits 
under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. SS 401- 
433 ("Act"). Fargnoli appeals the District Court's order 
granting summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner 
of the Social Security Administration (the "Commissioner").1 
The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. S 405(g). Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. For the reasons set forth below, we will vacate the 
District Court's order and remand the case with instruction 
to return it to the Commissioner for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
I. Factual and Procedural History 
 
Fargnoli is an unskilled construction labor er with a fifth 
grade education. He was born in Italy and came to the 
United States in 1964 at the age of seventeen. Far gnoli 
applied for disability insurance benefits on October 29, 
1993, alleging that as of May 10, 1985, he was disabled 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Social Security Administration is her einafter referred to as the 
"SSA." 
 
                                2 
  
and unable to work due to a work-related back injury. 
Because of his limited work history, Fargnoli's date last 
insured was December 31, 1990. He was denied benefits 
initially and on reconsideration.2  At Fargnoli's request, a 
hearing before an administrative law judge (the"ALJ") was 
held on February 15, 1996. 
 
Fargnoli appeared at the hearing with his counsel and 
testified, with the assistance of an Italian interpreter, about 
his back impairment. Fargnoli testified that he suffers from 
severe low back pain and radicular pain primarily in the 
left leg but at times in the right leg. He also testified that 
he sometimes has problems with numbness in his left arm. 
When asked how his impairment affects his ability to work 
around the house, Fargnoli testified that he has difficulty 
going up and down the stairs and is unable to do any 
household chores. He also testified that he has difficulty 
dressing because he cannot bend over. W ith regard to work 
restrictions, he testified that his back injury limits him to 
lifting approximately five to ten pounds, sitting or standing 
for only ten to twenty minutes at a time, and walking the 
equivalent of only one to two blocks. Further , he testified 
that although he occasionally drives, doing so is painful 
because he cannot take his pain medication which makes 
him sleepy and dizzy. He testified that his medications at 
the time of the ALJ hearing were Daypro, a nonsteroid anti- 
inflammatory, and Ultram, a pain reliever . 
 
The medical evidence of record, as developed before the 
ALJ, reflects that Fargnoli had been continuously treated 
with two doctors since his May 1985 injury -- Dr . Dennis 
B. Zaslow, an orthopedic surgeon, and Dr . Max Karpin, a 
neurosurgeon. Dr. Zaslow saw Far gnoli approximately once 
a month from September 1985 until approximately July 
1995. At Fargnoli's initial visit in September 1985, Dr. 
Zaslow diagnosed Fargnoli with an acute lower dorsal and 
lumbar sprain and strain and lumbosacral somatic 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The administrative review within the SSA of eligibility for disability 
insurance benefits involves a four-step pr ocedure, consisting of an 
initial 
determination, a request for reconsideration, a request for a hearing 
before an ALJ, and a request for r eview of the ALJ's decision by the 
Appeals Council. See 20 C.F.R. S 404.900. 
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dysfunction. He stated that Fargnoli's range of motion in 
his lower back was poor, his gait was labor ed and he 
favored his left leg. Further, he noted that Fargnoli's left 
shoulder was drooped lower than the right, his trunk was 
sidebent to the left and paravertebral spasms wer e seen in 
the lumbar muscles of the middle to lower back. Finally, he 
indicated that straight leg raising was causing radicular 
pain in Fargnoli's left leg. Based on his evaluations, Dr. 
Zaslow stated that Fargnoli could not work as of December 
31, 1990, his date last insured. 
 
Dr. Zaslow's treatment notes consistently document 
objective muscular symptoms associated with Far gnoli's 
back impairment, including his inability to perform or 
difficulty with squatting, bending, leg lifting, changing 
positions, sitting, standing and walking, his tender ness to 
palpitation and manipulation, and the often spastic 
condition of his low back. Dr. Zaslow's tr eatment notes also 
document the variability of Fargnoli's condition, which 
changed depending on various conditions, impr oved with 
prolonged periods of rest or immobilization and favorable 
weather, and worsened with periods of incr eased activity or 
occurrences of poor weather. 
 
In January 1986, Fargnoli began treatment with Dr. 
Karpin. At Fargnoli's initial visit, Dr . Karpin reported that 
Fargnoli had a labored gait, difficulty walking, was favoring 
the left lower extremity, and had limited flexion and 
paravertebral spasm. Dr. Karpin's diagnosis was post- 
traumatic status, low back syndrome, dorsolumbar sprain 
and strain and left lumbar radiculopathy. Dr . Karpin 
reported similar findings until approximately November 7, 
1986, when he noted that Fargnoli was showing gradual 
improvement. Dr. Karpin's later tr eatment notes reflect his 
opinion that Fargnoli suffered fr om chronic back pain that 
would improve and worsen periodically accor ding to factors 
such as activity and weather, but would neither improve 
nor worsen on a permanent basis from continued 
medication and physical therapy. Over the course of 
Fargnoli's treatment, Dr. Karpin prescribed numerous 
medications. 
 
The record reflects reports or mention of certain 
diagnostic tests, including an October 1985 EMG of 
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Fargnoli's left lower extremity, an October 1985 CT-scan of 
his lumbar spine, and a thermogram. In his November 17, 
1985 report, Dr. Zaslow states that the EMG was abnormal 
and notes that the findings were suggestive of 
radiculopathy at the L5 region. Further , he states that the 
CT-scan showed degeneration of the L3-L4 disc and a 
strong possibility of a fracture of the anterior edge of the 
superior plateau of L4. Finally, he notes that the 
thermogram was abnormal. A tomogram of the spine was 
performed in late 1985 to confir m the existence of a 
fracture. It indicated interosseous distal herniation of the 
lumbar spine, but no evidence of fracture. A February 1986 
MRI was performed that evidenced an abnormal disc 
intensity between L3-4 with a high degree of suspicion of 
herniation and abnormal discs between L1-2, L4-5 and L5- 
S1. A January 1986 bone scan was reported by Dr . Zaslow 
as being normal. Although strongly r ecommended by both 
Drs. Zaslow and Karpin to confirm disc her niation, Fargnoli 
would not agree to undergo a myelogram because of his 
fear of needles and invasive procedures. 
 
Additionally, the treatment notes of Dr . Zaslow and Dr. 
Karpin reflect that Fargnoli has under gone physical 
therapy, varying from three times a week to one time a 
week, from after his accident until appr oximately 
September 1991, although the treatment notes fr om his 
therapists are not included in the recor d.3 
 
On August 5, 1996, the ALJ issued an opinion denying 
Fargnoli's claim for disability insurance benefits, stating 
that "the evidence of record does not r eveal that the 
claimant's condition was sufficiently sever e to preclude him 
from performing at least light work. . . ." The Appeals 
Council of the SSA declined further review on October 4, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The record also includes the tr eatment notes and opinions of 
physicians treating or examining Fargnoli, or reviewing his medical 
records, after his date last insur ed (December 31, 1990). Because these 
treatment notes and opinions are for a time period after Fargnoli's last 
insured date and, with the exception of one tr eatment note from Dr. 
Karpin, were not mentioned in the ALJ's opinion, we do not know what 
significance, if any, they had in the ALJ's deter mination. On remand, the 
ALJ should discuss the significance of these r ecords and whether he is 
relying on any of them in reaching his determination. 
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1997, making the ALJ's determination the final decision of 
the Commissioner. 
 
Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Fargnoli 
filed an action in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania seeking judicial review of 
the ALJ's decision. The parties filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment. The District Court granted the 
Commissioner's request for summary judgment and denied 





A. Standard of Review. 
 
Although our review of the District Court's or der for 
summary judgment is plenary, "our review of the ALJ's 
decision is more deferential as we deter mine whether there 
is substantial evidence to support the decision of the 
Commissioner." Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 
2000). "Substantial evidence has been defined as `more 
than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate.' " Plummer v. 
Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Ventura v. 
Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir . 1995)). Where the ALJ's 
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, we 
are bound by those findings, even if we would have decided 
the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 
358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999). Thus, the general issue before us 
is whether the ALJ's finding that Fargnoli was not disabled, 
and thus not entitled to disability insurance benefits, is 
supported by substantial evidence. 
 
B. Determination of Disability 
 
Under the Social Security Act, a disability is established 
where the claimant demonstrates that ther e is some 
" `medically determinable basis for an impairment that 
prevents him from engaging in any `substantial gainful 
activity' for a statutory twelve-month period.' " Plummer, 
186 F.3d at 427 (quoting Stunkard v. Sec. of Health & 
Human Servs., 841 F.2d 57, 59 (3d Cir . 1988)); see also 20 
C.F.R. S 404.1505(a). A claimant is considered unable to 
engage in any substantial gainful activity "only if his 
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physical or mental impairment or impair ments are of such 
severity that he is not only unable to do his pr evious work 
but cannot, considering his age, education, and work 
experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful 
work which exists in the national economy . . . ." 42 U.S.C. 
S 423(d)(2)(A). This disability determination is made by the 
Commissioner based on a five-step sequential evaluation 
process promulgated by the Social Security Administration 
("SSA"). See 20 C.F.R. S 404.1520. In Plummer, this Court 
set out the relevant steps as follows: 
 
       In step one, the Commissioner must determine 
       whether the claimant is currently engaging in 
       substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. S [404.]1520(a). If 
       a claimant is found to be engaged in substantial 
       activity, the disability claim will be denied. Bowen v. 
       Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140, 107 S. Ct. 2287, 2290-91, 
       96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987). In step two, the Commissioner 
       must determine whether the claimant is suf fering from 
       a severe impairment. 20 C.F.R.S 404.1520(c). If the 
       claimant fails to show that her impairments ar e 
       "severe," she is ineligible for disability benefits. 
 
        In step three, the Commissioner compar es the 
       medical evidence of the claimant's impairment to a list 
       of impairments presumed severe enough to preclude 
       any gainful work. 20 C.F.R. S 404.1520(d). If a claimant 
       does not suffer from a listed impair ment or its 
       equivalent, the analysis proceeds to steps four and five. 
       Step four requires the ALJ to consider whether the 
       claimant retains the residual functional capacity to 
       perform her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. 
       S 404.1520(d). The claimant bears the bur den of 
       demonstrating an inability to return to her past 
       relevant work. Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 46 (3d 
       Cir. 1994). 
 
        If the claimant is unable to resume her for mer 
       occupation, the evaluation moves to the final step. At 
       this stage, the burden of production shifts to the 
       Commissioner, who must demonstrate the claimant is 
       capable of performing other available work in order to 
       deny a claim of disability. 20 C.F.R. S 404.1520(f). The 
       ALJ must show there are other jobs existing in 
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       significant numbers in the national economy which the 
       claimant can perform, consistent with her medical 
       impairments, age, education, past work experience, 
       and residual functional capacity. The ALJ must analyze 
       the cumulative effect of all the claimant's impairments 
       in determining whether she is capable of per forming 
       work and is not disabled. See 20 C.F .R. S 404.1523. 
       The ALJ will often seek the assistance of a vocational 
       expert at this fifth step. See, [sic] Podedworny v. 
       Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 218 (3d Cir . 1984). 
 
186 F.3d at 428. 
 
In this case, the ALJ undertook the five-step sequential 
evaluation in determining that Fargnoli was not disabled. 
The ALJ made the following findings: (1) Far gnoli had not 
engaged in any substantial gainful activity since the alleged 
onset date of disability; (2) he suffers fr om a severe back 
impairment; (3) his back impairment, although severe, does 
not meet or equal the criteria of the Listing of Impairments 
set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P , App. 1; (4) he 
retains the residual functional capacity to engage in light 
work, and therefore cannot retur n to his past relevant work 
as a construction laborer because it is heavy work; and (5) 
based on his age, educational background, work 
experience, and limitations, the medical vocational 
guidelines (the "Grids") direct a finding of not disabled. See 
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2,S 202.17. The ALJ 
erred, Fargnoli contends, at step four in determining that 
he retained the residual functional capacity to do light 
work. We agree.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Although not raised by Fargnoli, and therefore not an issue in this 
appeal, we also note our concern with the conclusion reached by the ALJ 
at step three in the sequential evaluation pr ocess and the discussion 
thereof. The ALJ determined that Far gnoli's back impairment did not 
meet the Listing of Impairments at 20 C.F .R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. 
He stated that "[n]o treating or examining physician has mentioned 
findings equivalent in severity to the criteria of any listed impairment. 
Particular consideration was given to Listing 1.00 (musculoskeletal 
system)." First, we note that in reviewing the voluminous medical 
evidence for our discussion of step four of the pr ocess, we found 
treatment notes and diagnostic tests ar guably meeting the Listing of 
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C. Step Four Evaluation: Residual Functional Capacity 
 
" `Residual functional capacity is defined as that which an 
individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused 
by his or her impairment(s).' " Bur nett v. Comm'r of Soc. 
Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir . 2000) (quoting 
Hartranft, 181 F.3d at 359 n.1); see also 20 C.F.R. 
S 404.1545(a). In this case, the ALJ deter mined that 
Fargnoli had the residual functional capacity to perform 
light work. The SSA defines work as "light" when it 
 
       involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with 
       frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 
       pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very 
       little, a job is in this category when it requires a good 
       deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting 
       most of the time with some pushing and pulling of ar m 
       or leg controls. To be considered capable of performing 
       a full or wide range or light work, you must have the 
       ability to do substantially all of these activities. 
 
20 C.F.R. S 404.1567(b). The SSA has further explained 
that "light work generally requires the ability to stand and 
carry weight for approximately six hours of an eight hour 
day." Jesurum v. Sec. of Health & Human Servs., 48 F.3d 
114, 119 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Social Security Ruling 83- 
10). 
 
After reviewing the record, we find it impossible to 
determine whether the ALJ's finding that Far gnoli can 
perform light work is supported by substantial evidence. 
We are handicapped by the fact that the ALJ has (1) failed 
to evaluate adequately all relevant evidence and to explain 
the basis of his conclusions and (2) failed to explain his 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Impairments in S 1.05 (disorders of the spine). Second, we note that this 
Court requires more than just a conclusory statement that a claimant 
does not meet the listings. See Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 
220 F.3d 112, 119-20 (3d Cir. 2000) (r emanding where conclusory 
statement "is similarly beyond meaningful judicial review," with 
directions that ALJ should "fully develop the record and explain his 
findings at step three, including an analysis of whether and why [the 
claimant's] . . . impairments . . . ar e or are not equivalent in severity 
to 
one of the listed impairments"). 
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assessment of the credibility of, and weight given to, the 
medical evidence and opinions from Fargnoli's treating 
physicians that contradict the ALJ's finding that Fargnoli 
can perform light work. We ther efore vacate the decision of 
the District Court and remand with instruction to remand 
to the ALJ for further proceedings.5  
 
       1. The ALJ Must Evaluate All the Evidence and Explain 
       the Basis for his Conclusions. 
 
The ALJ must consider all relevant evidence when 
determining an individual's residual functional capacity in 
step four. See 20 C.F.R. SS 404.1527(e)(2), 404.1545(a), 
404.1546; Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121. That evidence includes 
medical records, observations made during formal medical 
examinations, descriptions of limitations by the claimant 
and others, and observations of the claimant's limitations 
by others. See 20 C.F.R. S 404.1545(a). Moreover, the ALJ's 
finding of residual functional capacity must"be 
accompanied by a clear and satisfactory explication of the 
basis on which it rests." Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 
(3d Cir. 1981). In Cotter, we explained that 
 
       [i]n our view an examiner's findings should be as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Fargnoli urges us to conclude further that the ALJ improperly relied 
on Fargnoli's desire to retur n to work at a light exertional level and to 
take a trip to Europe as substantial evidence that he could perform light 
work. Although it is not the primary basis for our r emand, we agree. In 
this particular case, we believe that Fargnoli's expressed desire to 
return 
to work at a light duty job cannot support a finding that he is actually 
capable of such work when he later testified that he cannot perform light 
work and his testimony is consistent with restrictions imposed by his 
treating physician. See Talbot v. Heckler, 814 F.2d 1456, 1461 (10th Cir. 
1987) (claimant's application for vocational training did not create 
inference that "claimant thought he could work at a full range of light 
activity" as opposed to a "limited range of light or sedentary activity"). 
Furthermore, Fargnoli's trip to Eur ope in 1988 cannot be the basis for 
a finding that he is capable of doing a light exertional job because 
sporadic and transitory activities cannot be used to show an ability to 
engage in substantial gainful activity. See Jesurum, 48 F.3d at 119 
(claimant's trip to Rhode Island two years prior to hearing was a 
"sporadic and transitory activity that cannot be used to show an ability 
to engage in substantial gainful activity"). 
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       comprehensive and analytical as feasible and, where 
       appropriate, should include a statement of subordinate 
       factual foundations on which ultimate factual 
       conclusions are based, so that a reviewing court may 
       know the basis for the decision. This is necessary so 
       that the court may properly exercise its r esponsibility 
       under 42 U.S.C. S 405(g) to determine if the Secretary's 
       decision is supported by substantial evidence. 
 
Id. at 705 (quoting Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309, 
312 (3d Cir. 1974)). 
 
The ALJ's discussion of the relevant medical evidence in 
Fargnoli's case was limited to the following four paragraphs: 
 
       A medical report from [Dr. Zaslow], doctor of 
       osteopathy, dated December 16, 1995, revealed that 
       the claimant complained of increasing pain since his 
       work-related accident in May 1985. Dr. Zaslow stated 
       a computerized tomography scan of the lumbar spine, 
       done on October 19, 1985, indicated degeneration of 
       the L3-4 disc. A thermogram done on October 24, 1985 
       was reported as normal and showed L4-L5 nerve fiber 
       involvement on the left side. An electromyography 
       performed on October 30, 1985 showed evidence of 
       radiculopathy. A medical report from Dr . Zaslow, dated 
       December 5, 1986, stated that a bone scan per formed 
       on January 22, 1986 was completely normal. The 
       claimant stated that he was able to stand for an hour 
       and sit for several hours. 
 
       A report by [Dr. Karpin], dated December 12, 1986, 
       stated that a magnetic resonance imaging showed 
       abnormal disc intensity between L3-4, and abnormal 
       disc between L-1 and L-2, and to a lesser extent 
       between L-4, 5 and L5-S1. It was reported that the 
       claimant refused to undergo a myelogram to confirm 
       the findings and chose to continue with the 
       conservative treatments for a while longer . Dr. Karpin 
       stated that the claimant has to maintain a 1,000 
       calorie [diet] to lose weight in order to reduce the 
       pressure on his back. 
 
       A report by Dr. Zaslow, dated December 4, 1987, 
       stated that the claimant complained about pain over 
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       the midline. There was considerable spasm of the back 
       with the inability to flex forward. The claimant stated 
       that he wanted a light duty job, but no light duty work 
       was available for him. 
 
       A medical report by Dr. Karpin, dated February 22, 
       1991, stated that the claimant was still having 
       difficulty with his lower back, but was able to cope 
       with the pain and discomfort as long as he took his 
       muscle relaxant and non-steroidal anti-inflammatory. 
       The claimant was maintained on Robaxin, Feldene and 
       physical therapy.6 
 
In the passages quoted above, the ALJ describes four 
diagnostic tests and five treatment notes. Y et our review of 
the record reflects over 115 pages of relevant, probative 
treatment notes from Drs. Zaslow and Karpin detailing 
Fargnoli's medical condition and progr ess. The disparity 
between the actual record and the ALJ's sparse synopsis of 
it makes it impossible for us to review the ALJ's decision, 
for we "cannot tell if significant probative evidence was not 
credited or simply ignored." Bur nett, 220 F.3d at 121 
(quoting Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705). 
 
Although we do not expect the ALJ to make refer ence to 
every relevant treatment note in a case where the claimant, 
such as Fargnoli, has voluminous medical r ecords, we do 
expect the ALJ, as the factfinder, to consider and evaluate 
the medical evidence in the record consistent with his 
responsibilities under the regulations and case law. His 
failure to do so here leaves us little choice but to remand 
for a more comprehensive analysis of the evidence 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The Commissioner argues that the ALJ'sfinding is further supported 
by a workers' compensation commutation enter ed into by Fargnoli in 
1995, in which he stipulates that he has an agr eed earning power of a 
certain sum, and the opinions of three doctors examining Fargnoli after 
his date last insured for disability benefits (December 31, 1990). See 
Appellee's Br. at 3-4. Although this infor mation may have been in the 
file 
before the ALJ, there is no evidence in the record that any of it was 
considered by him. Furthermore, after reviewing the record, we cannot 
find two of the opinions relied on by the Commissioner. We therefore 
cannot consider them as a basis for finding that the ALJ's decision is 
supported by substantial evidence. 
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consistent with the requirements of applicable regulations 
and the law of this Circuit, both as discussed in more detail 
below. 
 
       2. The ALJ Must Assess the Credibility of, and Explain 
       the Weight Given To, Conflicting Medical Evidence by 
       the Claimant's Treating Physicians. 
 
This Court has long been concerned with ALJ opinions 
that fail properly to consider, discuss and weigh relevant 
medical evidence. See Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 
403, 406-07 (3d Cir. 1979) ("This Court has repeatedly 
emphasized that the special nature of pr oceedings for 
disability benefits dictates care on the part of the agency in 
developing an administrative record and in explicitly 
weighing all evidence."). Where ther e is conflicting probative 
evidence in the record, we recognize a particularly acute 
need for an explanation of the reasoning behind the ALJ's 
conclusions, and will vacate or remand a case where such 
an explanation is not provided. See Cotter , 642 F.2d at 706 
(listing cases remanded for ALJ's failur e to provide 
explanation of reason for rejecting or not addressing 
relevant probative evidence). 
 
In his opinion the ALJ finds Fargnoli to have a severe 
back impairment, but not so severe that it prevents him 
from performing light work that includes frequently lifting 
ten pounds, occasionally lifting twenty pounds, and 
standing and walking for six hours out of an eight-hour 
day. In reaching this finding, the ALJ does not mention the 
contradictory finding of Dr. Zaslow, nor does he explain his 
assessment of the credibility of Drs. Zaslow and Karpin or 
the weight given to their treatment notes and opinions. 
 
Under applicable regulations and the law of this Court, 
opinions of a claimant's treating physician ar e entitled to 
substantial and at times even controlling weight. See 20 
C.F.R. S 404.1527(d)(2); Cotter, 642 F.2d at 704. The 
regulations explain that more weight is given to a 
claimant's treating physician because 
 
       these sources are likely to be the medical professionals 
       most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of 
       [the claimant's] medical impairment(s) and may bring a 
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       unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot 
       be obtained from the objective medical findings alone 
       or from reports of individual examinations, such as 
       consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations. 
 
20 C.F.R. S 404.1527(d)(2). Wher e a treating source's 
opinion on the nature and severity of a claimant's 
impairment is "well-supported by medically acceptable 
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not 
inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in[the 
claimant's] case record," it will be given "controlling weight." 
Id. 
 
Although the ALJ may weigh the credibility of the 
evidence, he must give some indication of the evidence that 
he rejects and his reason(s) for discounting that evidence. 
See Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121; Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705. In 
Burnett, we determined that the ALJ had not met his 
responsibilities because he "fail[ed] to consider and explain 
his reasons for discounting all of the pertinent evidence 
before him in making his residual functional capacity 
determination." 220 F.3d at 121. W e therefore remanded 
the case to the ALJ with instructions to "r eview all of the 
pertinent medical evidence, explaining any conciliations 
and rejections." Id. at 122. 
 
The record reflects that thr oughout his treating history 
Dr. Zaslow consistently found Fargnoli to suffer from a 
severe and dehabilitating chronic back condition that often 
requires bed rest or immobilization. Countless treatment 
notes document Fargnoli's spastic condition, the immobility 
of his lower back, the radicular pain to his legs and his 
tenderness to palpitation and manipulation. Fargnoli points 
out that Dr. Zaslow has opined on twenty-thr ee separate 
occasions that he is disabled. Dr. Zaslow has restricted 
Fargnoli to only seven to ten pounds of lifting, no prolonged 
periods of walking and no climbing, bending or squatting. 
He has also opined that Fargnoli is incapable of even 
sedentary work. 
 
Although never opining on Fargnoli's vocational 
restrictions or limitations, Dr. Karpin's clinical findings are 
consistent with Fargnoli's complaints. Dr . Karpin found 
that Fargnoli suffers from r educed mobility, spasms and 
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tenderness to palpitation. Further, Dr . Karpin's treatment 
notes document the sensitivity of Fargnoli's back 
impairment to changes in the weather and his activity level. 
Finally, Dr. Karpin noted that, although Far gnoli's chronic 
condition can be maintained at status quo with continued 
medication and physical therapy, he will continue to suffer 
symptoms associated with his back impairment. 
 
The ALJ makes no mention of any of these significant 
contradictory findings, leaving us to wonder whether he 
considered and rejected them, consider ed and discounted 
them, or failed to consider them at all. "The ALJ's failure to 
explain his implicit rejection of this evidence or even to 
acknowledge its presence was error." Cotter, 642 F.2d at 707.7 
We therefore cannot conclude that his findings at step four 
were supported by substantial evidence. Mor eover, we 
cannot affirm the ALJ's determination that Fargnoli was not 
disabled under the Grids because that determination 




For the foregoing reasons, the District Court's order 
granting summary judgment to the Commissioner will be 
vacated and remanded to the District Court with 
instructions to remand to the Commissioner for additional 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. On r emand, the 
ALJ must consider and make specific findings as to all of 
the relevant probative medical evidence, including 
assessing the credibility of the evidence and weighing that 
evidence. Further, to the extent that the ALJ reaches a 
finding contradictory to that of Fargnoli's treating 
physicians, he must explain the reasoning behind such a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The District Court, apparently recognizing the ALJ's failure to 
consider 
all of the relevant and probative evidence, attempted to rectify this 
error 
by relying on medical records found in its own independent analysis, 
and which were not mentioned by the ALJ. This runs counter to the 
teaching of SEC v. Chenery Corporation, 318 U.S. 80 (1943), that "[t]he 
grounds upon which an administrative or der must be judged are those 
upon which the record discloses that its action was based." Id. at 87; see 
also Healtheast Bethesda Lutheran Hosp. & Rehab. Ctr . v. Shalala, 164 
F.3d 415, 418 (8th Cir. 1998) (r ecognizing Chenery in case deciding 
claim for Social Security disability insurance benefits). 
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finding, including reconciling conflicts and discussing how 
and why probative evidence supporting Far gnoli's claim was 
discounted and/or rejected. 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
I respectfully dissent. This case presents the not 
uncommon conflict between treating physician and 
independent medical examiner. The treating physician has 
determined that the petitioner is unable to work. The 
independent medical examiner finds that the objective tests 
do not substantiate the subjective complaints and that the 
petitioner is exaggerating. In view of the fact that the 
Administrative Law Judge credited the testimony of the 
latter, rather than the former, I am persuaded that the 
decision is supported by sufficient evidence. I am also 
concerned by the petitioner's refusal to permit tests and 
treatment that would alleviate a ruptur ed disc if that is 
indeed his problem. For these reasons, I would affirm the 
decision of the District Court, upholding the deter mination 
of the Administrative Law Judge. 
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